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NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
     London International Travel, Ltd., Latin American Travel, 
Inc., and Stanley and Beverly Berger, previously the sole owners 
of London and Latin, appeal several orders entered in the 
bankruptcy of the debtor, Trans World Airlines, Inc.  
     The bankruptcy court denied the following motions: 1) the 
Motion to Proceed; that is, to recognize their compulsory 
counterclaim as an informal proof of claim, or alternatively, for 
leave to file a proof of claim out of time, and for relief from 
the discharge injunction to prosecute their claims to judgment; 
and, 2) the motion to bar the claims of TWA against London/Latin 
and the Bergers.  The district court affirmed.  We will reverse 
in part, affirm in part and remand. 
                                I. 
     On January 31, 1992, TWA filed a voluntary Chapter 11 
petition.  The bankruptcy court set May 15, 1992 as the claims 
bar date.  The Bergers presented no claim by that date.  On 
August 12, 1993, the bankruptcy court confirmed TWA's Second 
Amended Plan of Reorganization, effective November 3, 1993. 
     On April 7, 1993, TWA sued the Bergers, London and Latin in 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Missouri, asserting a federal RICO claim and several state law 
causes of action.  The Bergers filed a compulsory counterclaim in 
response on April 22, alleging defamation.  TWA filed its answer 
on May 12. 
     In March 1994, the district court dismissed TWA's RICO claim 
with prejudice and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 
over the parties' state law claims.  The parties then refiled 
their respective state law claims in Missouri state court. 
     The Bergers allege that TWA made defamatory statements about 
them between October 1990 and December 1992.  For its part, TWA 
asserted claims of fraud, money had and received, and breach of 
contract.  TWA filed a motion in state court to dismiss the 
Bergers' defamation claim, on the ground that the bankruptcy 
court had discharged TWA from all debts, except as otherwise 
provided in the Confirmation Order, that the Confirmation Order 
did not except the Bergers' claim from discharge, and that the 
Bergers were enjoined by 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) from commencing or 
continuing their suit.  Subsequently, the Bergers and 
London/Latin moved the bankruptcy court for leave to proceed to 
judgment on their claims and to bar TWA's.  The bankruptcy court 
denied these motions, and the district court affirmed.  In re 
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 182 B.R. 102 (D. Del. 1995).  This 
appeal followed.  We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 158(d). 
                               II. 
     The Bergers argue that the bankruptcy court should have 
granted their motion to proceed to judgment in state court 
because TWA failed to notify them of the confirmation hearing 
date.  They assert that TWA had notice of their status as 
potential creditors in TWA's bankruptcy once the Bergers asserted 
their compulsory counterclaim two months before the June 1993 
notice of the confirmation hearing.  The Bergers argue that, 
because 11 U.S.C. § 1128 requires notice of the confirmation 
hearing to all parties in interest, and because they did not 
receive formal notice, enforcing the discharge as to their claims 
would violate the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. 
                                A. 
     The Berger's state court complaint alleges four instances of 
defamation: October 22, 1990; January 30 and August 6, 1991; and 
sometime in December 1992.  The complaint recites that the 
Bergers had entered into a profitable contract to sell their 
agencies to another concern, Meritek, but that Meritek, upon 
hearing the alleged defamation, refused to tender the remaining 
payments due under the contract and dismissed the Bergers from 
their employment.  Meritek also sued the Bergers for fraud, which 
the Bergers allege they settled on unfavorable terms. 
     Three of the above four instances of alleged defamation 
occurred before TWA filed its bankruptcy petition on January 31, 
1992.  As such, they are prepetition claims that were required, 
absent excusable neglect, to be asserted before the bar date of 
May 15, 1992.  The Bergers failed to assert their claims by that 
date.  They nevertheless argue that the bar date should not be 
enforced as to them because they received inadequate notice of 
the proceedings.  We reject that argument. 
     The Bergers admit that TWA did not know of their defamation 
claim until they filed their compulsory counterclaim on April 22, 
1993.  This admission is fatal.  When TWA gave notice of the 
claims bar date, the Bergers were unknown creditors entitled 
solely to publication notice.  Chemetron Corp. v. Jones, 72 F.3d 
341, 348 (3d Cir. 1995) ("It is well established that, in 
providing notice to unknown creditors, constructive notice of the 
bar claims date by publication satisfies the requirements of due 
process."); see New York v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. 
Co., 344 U.S. 293, 297, 73 S.Ct. 299, 301 (1953); Mullane v. 
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 
652, 657 (1950).  TWA duly published the requisite notices; 
hence, the Bergers constructively received the notice to which 
they were constitutionally entitled.  We therefore conclude that 
TWA's discharge in bankruptcy eradicated the Bergers' claims for 
any prepetition defamation. 
     We acknowledge that the bankruptcy court could allow unknown 
creditors to assert claims after the bar date upon a showing of 
excusable neglect.  Such creditors would be thereafter entitled 
to the formal notice accorded other creditors who filed timely 
claims.  The Bergers, however, neither claimed nor demonstrated 
excusable neglect.  Accordingly, the bankruptcy court could not 
allow their participation in the bankruptcy even after they made 
known their prepetition claims against TWA.  See In re 
Vertientes, Ltd., 845 F.2d 57, 60 (3d Cir. 1982); accordChemetron, 72 F.3d 
at 349 ("[B]ecause claimants are unknown 
creditors and Chemetron's publication notice was sufficient, 
claimants must show that their failure to file in a timely manner 
was due to 'excusable neglect;' otherwise, their claims arising 
pre-petition will be barred."); In re Best Products Co., 140 B.R. 
353, 359 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992).  The bar date means just that; 
it is a "drop-dead date" that bars all prepetition claimants who 
received the required notice.  Because the Bergers failed to 
assert their prepetition claims by the bar date and failed to 
show excusable neglect, those claims are legally dead. 
     The Bergers also argue that, inasmuch as TWA knew about 
their compulsory counterclaim, the bankruptcy court should have 
treated the compulsory counterclaim as an informal proof of claim 
in the TWA bankruptcy proceeding.  This argument also fails, at a 
minimum, because the Bergers never asserted their claims before 
the bar date, and the bankruptcy court could not allow them to 
file a belated proof of claim absent a showing of excusable 
neglect. 
                                B. 
     This does not end our inquiry, however.  The Bergers also 
allege that TWA defamed them in or about December 1992, some 
eleven months after the bankruptcy petition was filed and seven 
months after the bar date.  TWA was on notice of this claim as of 
April 22, 1993, when the Bergers filed their compulsory 
counterclaim, yet failed to give the Bergers formal notice of the 
confirmation hearing scheduled for June of that year. 
     It is well-settled that a known creditor is entitled to 
formal notice of impending bankruptcy proceedings.  Chemetron, 72 
F.3d at 346.  This is true even where, as here, the creditor has 
actual knowledge of the pendency of bankruptcy proceedings 
generally, but is not given formal notice of the confirmation 
hearing.  In re Harbor Tank Storage Co., 385 F.2d 111, 114-15 (3d 
Cir. 1967).  A creditor will be deemed to be "known" to the 
debtor if the debtor has either actual knowledge of its existence 
or if its identity "can be identified through reasonably diligent 
efforts."  Chemetron, 72 F.3d at 346 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
     In Chemetron, we stated that, while "a vast, open 
investigation[]" is not required, the debtor must undertake a 
careful examination and diligent search of its own books and 
records.  Id. at 346-47.  Here, although the Bergers filed their 
defamation action as a counterclaim to TWA's fraud suit rather 
than proceeding in the bankruptcy court, we are convinced that a 
diligent search of TWA's records by its bankruptcy counsel would, 
or at least should, have revealed the Berger claims.  Hence, the 
Bergers were known creditors with respect to the postpetition 
defamation they alleged. 
     That conclusion mandates that we reverse the district 
court's decision to deny the Bergers' motion to proceed.  Because 
they were not given actual notice of the confirmation hearing, 
their postpetition defamation claims could not have been 
discharged in bankruptcy.  See Dalton Development Project v. 
Unsecured Creditors Committee (In re Unioil), 948 F.2d 678, 682- 
84 (10th Cir. 1991); In re Pettibone Corp., 151 B.R. 166, 170-73 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993).  We emphasize, however, that on remand, 
the Bergers must prove that a defamatory statement was published 
in or around December 1992, and that they proximately suffered 
injury as a result.  If the evidence at trial reveals only 
prepetition tortious conduct, then the Bergers' claims are 
discharged. 
                               III. 
     Each appellant further argues that TWA's state court claims 
against the Bergers, London and Latin were not properly included 
among TWA's assets in bankruptcy so that action on those claims 
would be barred by res judicata and estoppel.  The Bergers, 
London and Latin, separately allege that TWA failed to include 
its claims against them among its schedules of assets filed with 
the bankruptcy court.  They contend that TWA's failure to 
disclose those claims bars it from asserting them in the present 
action.  The bankruptcy court found that the claims were properly 
included.  The bankruptcy court specifically found that "(i) the 
debtor did properly include its said claims among the assets in 
its schedules although not identifying the movants by name, and 
(ii) the Order confirming the plan does provide for the debtor to 
retain the right to collect its assets, which would thus include 
its claims against movants."  These findings are not clearly 
erroneous; hence we must reject appellants' argument. 
                               IV. 
     The district and bankruptcy courts also erred in another 
aspect.  Without comment or explanation, the bankruptcy court 
denied the Bergers' motion to set off under 11 U.S.C. § 553.  The 
district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's denial of setoff.  
In affirming, the district court noted that the confirmation 
order discharged TWA from all claims arising before the 
confirmation date.  It then observed that 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) 
might bar a setoff.  The district court, however, did not decide 
whether setoff was available against a discharged debtor.  
Instead, assuming arguendo that there could be setoff, the 
district court considered whether the mutuality requirement of 
§ 553 had been satisfied.  Ruling on the mutuality of the claims, 
the district court stated: 
     In their state court petition, the Bergers allege that 
     TWA published "false, defamatory, libelous and 
     slanderous statements, to-wit:  that the Bergers 
     dishonestly and fraudulently misappropriated moneys 
     from TWA by shifting market share on non-TWA airlines 
     from London to Latin."  This allegation of dishonest 
     and fraudulent misappropriation forms the basis for 
     TWA's count I.  If TWA should prevail on count I, the 
     Bergers' defamation claim will be extinguished.  The 
     claims, therefore, are not mutual, and any recovery the 
     Bergers might theoretically win for their claim would 
     not be properly characterized a set off. 
 
TWA, 182 B.R. at 109 (citation omitted). 
 
     It is true that if TWA prevails on its fraud count, the 
Bergers cannot prevail on their defamation claim and there will 
thus be no defamation recovery to set off.  If the Bergers 
prevail on the defamation claim, TWA could not successfully 
demonstrate fraud.  Were these the only two claims at issue, the 
lack of mutuality would be apparent.  For mutuality to exist, 
both claims must not be mutually exclusive, so that the 
creditor's setoff claim can be subtracted from the bankruptcy 
debtor's claim. 
     The district court failed to address the possibility that 
TWA might not prevail on Count I (fraud), but might still prevail 
on Count II (money had and received) or Count III (breach of 
contract).  In such a circumstance, it would be theoretically 
possible for the Bergers to prevail on their defamation claim.  
The Bergers might be found to have been defamed without 
committing fraud, but might still be found liable on the other 
legal theories alleged by TWA in Counts II and III.  The district 
court must consider whether the Bergers' defamation claim could 
be deemed mutual with TWA's Count II claim or Count III claim.  
We will remand to give the district court the opportunity to 
decide the issue in the first instance. 
                                V. 
     For these reasons, and to the extent we have described, we 
will reverse in part, affirm in part and remand the cause for 
further proceedings. 
